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I propose a relational understanding of ontological security, based on a synthesis of 
pragmatist philosophy and relational sociology. This relocates the referent of ontological 
security from the self to the social arrangements in where action takes place. It implies that 
actors seek not to secure the coherence and stability of self in particular, but rather of their 
broader social context. By taking this relational approach, international relations scholars 
may avoid methodological difficulties in accessing or defining the cognitive or affective 
processes shaping certain actors, while honing in on the social embeddedness of action. I 
outline three causal mechanisms for theorizing ontological security in particular cases: 
refereeing, performative deference, and obstructive resistance. I do so with reference to 
prominent methodological frameworks in relational sociology—namely, those based on fields 
and on figurations, respectively. Finally, I connect this new approach to theorizing 
ontological security to existing trends in relational international relations research. I argue 
that it provides a theoretical architecture more sensitive to action and agency than is offered 
by many existing relational approaches, and is especially well-suited to the study of 
precarious forms of transnational life. 
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Introduction 
Early work on ontological security argued that concerns over the maintenance of the self, 
rather than simple ‘material interests’, drive foreign policy and international relations. 
Scholars working on ontological security argue that it explains why international actors (such 
as states or policymakers) do things that, from a traditional security perspective, appear costly 
or even directly compromise their physical security. They contend that actors must secure 
their social existence before they are able to do anything else, and that this offers important 
insight into well-known dyanamics in international security, such as the persistence of 
mutually destructive conflicts and the pervasiveness of security dilemmas under conditions of 
uncertainty (Mitzen 2006b; Mitzen and Schweller 2011).  
However, to the extent that these scholars offer explanations with reference to 
psychological processes—that is to say, with an emphasis on particular thoughts and 
feelings—they encounter two kinds of methodological problems. First, they must assume that 
actors’ speech and expression authentically and reliably provides access to their inner selves, 
whether in terms of moral commitments or experienced emotions. Second, they must begin 
with defined views about the nature of those inner selves in the first place, and about the 
causal relationship between ethical beliefs and feelings, on the one hand, and the particular 
actions or outcomes under investigation, on the other.  In some circumtances, these 
assumptions prove unproblematic, but in others they are unwarranted or limiting.  
These assumptions are not essential to the study of ontological security, however. By 
defining the referent of ontological security through the terms of relational sociology, we can 
retain the critical and explanatory themes of the research program, but re-orient them around 
a factors and processes less dependent on the specific beliefs or feelings of actors. In this 
note, I propose such a reformulation.  
I begin by tracing the themes of existing ontological security scholarship, defining 
both its critical contributions and its most prevalent explanatory modes. This examination 
shows why an emphasis on psychological or affective dimensions—that is, on the beliefs, 
values, and feelings of actors—runs up against methodological limits, and how an alternative 
drawn from relational sociology would be preferable for some research problems. I then offer 
one such alternative by relocating the referent of ontological security from the self to the 
broader contexts in which selves emerge and interact, termed ‘social arrangements’. If this is 
the referent of ontological security, then actors are not trying to secure the coherence and 
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stability of self, but rather of their broader social context. To further develop this alternative, I 
outline three relational ontological security mechanisms: refereeing, performative deference, 
and obstructive resistance. By building theories with these mechanisms, scholars can provide 
ontological security explanations without reference to the routines and anxieties of selfhood, 
and thus orient causal analyses primarily around non-psychological factors. 
 
Ontological Security in International Relations 
Early ontological security scholarship in the field criticized narrow realist and liberal views 
of security and of security-seeking actions. It also questioned, from within, the liberal bias of 
existing constructivist theorising. It argued that behaviour that appears, in conventioanl 
frameworks, irrational—such as engaging in costly, risky, and apparently unnecessary 
conflict—appears as entirely rational, when construed as an attempt to “experience oneself as 
a whole, continuous person in time…in order to realize a sense of agency” (Mitzen 2006a, 
342; see also Steele 2008). Put differently: “Ordinary day-to-day life…involves an 
ontological security expressing an autonomy of bodily control within predictable 
routines…of what are in Goffman’s term “protective devices”, which sustain the mutuality 
implied in trust via tact and other formulae that preserve the face of others.” (Giddens 1984, 
51) For scholars of international relations, then, the concept of ontological security provides a 
way of understanding the relationship between values, identities, and routinized actions. As 
implied by the term ‘ontological’, this approach to conceptualising security mainly works by 
embracing a more holistic understanding of what is being secured—namely, a more 
expansive view of what aspects of being matter in international relations. The framework 
explains why some states remain trapped in apparently self-destructive rivalries or military 
adventures. It also directs attention to the principles and prerogatives of any given actor, 
because these are what define identities and therefore what must be secured. 
Since its introduction to the field, we’ve seen an evolution in the way that scholars 
cash out—and apply empiricallly—ontological security.. Initially prominent was the 
approach pioneered by Anthony Giddens (1979; 1984), in which the concept plays a key role 
in knitting together the ‘duality of structure and agency’ definitive of his structuration theory. 
Even in loyal Giddensian form, it delivers on this critical promise: by challenging notions 
that actor identity primarily orients around material preservation, ontological security 
provided a new avenue of enquiry into world politics otherwise closed by the rationalist 
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paradigm debates of the 1980s and 90s.1 But scholars of international relations have pushed 
beyond Giddens in search of greater traction, incorporating a wider range of psychological 
and affective forces. This is evident in Mitzen’s (2006a) study of European identity as a 
civilizing force and in Kinnvall’s (2004) research into how the transnational popularity of 
religious social movements stems from their role in alleviating existential anxiety.2 That trend 
has continued, with more recent work focusing on emotions and affect (Solomon 2013), and 
on the cognitive role of self-affirming narratives (Subotic 2015).  
As it stands now, the ontological security literature may be roughly divided between 
research focusing on the socially situated constitution of identity and selfhood (Mitzen 2006a; 
Rumelili 2015) and research focusing on the affective dimensions of the human figures who 
steer state policy (Steele 2008; Zarakol 2010). However, even the former rests upon 
explorations of subjectivity and psychology, in order to underwrite the causal explanations in 
which ontological security features. 
Within this literature, psychological and affective factors receive particular emphasis. 
The concept of ontological security mostly encompasses processes of self-perception and 
self-experience. These proveide mechanisms for averting existential dread or anxiety. This 
theme was present in early ontological security scholarship (see Kinnvall 2004) and remains 
prominent in more recent work as well (see Croft 2012; Kay 2012; Subotic and Zarakol 2013; 
Subotic 2015). Some ontological security theorising departs from this by incorporating a 
broader range of ‘external’ factors—such as discursive formations and interactions3—but this 
work represents a minority position in the research program. That is, the core concepts 
around which most ontological security scholars arrange their work are ideational constructs, 
habits, and emotions associated with the maintenance of the self and perturbations thereof. 
 
Why a relational theory of ontological security? 
 
1For example, Steele (2005) drew on Giddens to explain British neutrality during the American Civil War, 
arguing that Britain’s liberalism and opposition to the slave trade precluded helping the Confederacy despite it 
having other interests in doing so. Ayşe Zarakol (2010) takes a more macro-historical view ontological security 
to explain Turkish and Japanese unwillingness to acknowledge historical crimes dating back to the world wars, 
despite the benefits that making such apologies would offer. 
2Kinvall (2006) later gives the same subject a book-length treatment, and focuses in particular detail on religious 
nationalism in India. 
3For example, Solomon (2014) is interested in the manipulation of affect through social interaction, and 
Rumelili (2015) treats the referent of ontological security as a narrative relation rather than a psychological 
construct. 
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Setting aside debates over paradigmatic commitments,4 I see two practical, 
methodological reasons to develop a relational view of ontological security—one that does 
not emphasize psychological and affective factors.  
First, studies into these factors require that researchers assume that actors 
communicate their authentic beliefs and feelings in some reliable way. Of course, actors need 
not always be honest or even self-aware. But the researcher usually, in the end, infers the 
mental and emotionals states of actors’ expressions. Hence their expressions , must accurately 
and authentically serve as a window into their thoughts, feelings, and motives. This remains 
true even of ontological security scholarship that is otherwise very attentive to relational 
dimensions.5 Yet these assumptions often prove problematic.  Political elites are generally 
highly conscious of the need for image management, as well as practiced and experienced in 
dissembling, obfuscation, or hedging. In consequence, their statements may not be reliable 
indicators.6 In instances where scholars analyze testimonies by elites, the possibility always 
remains that the ‘self’ on display amounts to a deliberate misrepresentation—one designed to 
convey a false image of who the actor is and what they want. In such circumstances, we 
should treat assertions as forms of rhetorical (or discursive) maneuvering in the context of 
public procedures or structures of legitimacy (see, for example, Krebs and Jackson 2007; 
Goddard and Krebs 2015; Goddard 2006; 2009; 2015). Beyond this, we face broader 
questions about the validity of narrative accounts.Actors’ narratives tend to retrospectively 
organize their actions into a more coherent, consistent, and deliberate set of thoughts, 
feelings, and choices than was in fact the case (Tilly 1999). In other words, actors’ interests 
and perspectives may be different from what researchers assume, we often lack clear ways of 
inferring from their words what they actually think and feel, and we may have good reasons 
to avoid such inferences in the first place.7  
 
4 From a philosophy of social science perspective, psychological or motivational accounts of action, such as 
those associated with rational choice theory (Elster 1989) or hermeneutic approaches (Weber 1997; Habermas 
1968), treat reasons as causes (von Wright 1971). In doing so they are open to contention from a number of 
approaches, both realist and anti-realist, that call into question the validity of any explanation based upon them 
(Calhoun 1998; Boudon 1998). However, I see no good reason to launch this meta-theoretical broadside, both 
because it does not in any case cover all existing ontological security literature and because my intention is to 
contribute to, rather than explode or significantly re-direct, an existing project of research. 
5Steele (2008), for example, infers feelings of shame and the desire to maintain a self-perception of potency 
(2010) in the public statements and policy choices of decisionmakers. 
6Consider, for example, the range of possible moral or affective interpretations one might reach in examining 
how Israeli defense officials justify the use of assassination (Pratt 2013). 
7See, for example, the central research problem in Zarakol (2010, 4): ‘The reluctance of both Turkey and Japan 
to apologize for past state crimes is puzzling, because in both cases there are significant material incentives to 
apologize, and high costs attached to not apologizing’. But Zarakol has merely assumed that such benefits and 
costs are salient to Turkish and Japanese policymakers, explaining their intransigence through macro-historical 
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This problem is hard to solve through a deeply hermeneutic or interpretive 
explanatory approach to theory, as opposed to explanations oriented around broader inter-
subjective processes or social structures (Habermas 1968; Ricoeur 1970; see also Clarke 
2006). Scholars must use communicative gestures to identify, describe, and assign causal 
weight to mental and affective content. Not all cases may feature strong incentives for actors 
to dissemble, while documentary evidence may help pre-empt retrospective and self-
interested narrative ‘massaging’. However, for scholars studying sensitive and controversial 
policies—such as thoserelated to national security, military and counter-terrorism practices, 
or post-conflict justice and reconciliation—the assumption of authenticity places research on 
shaky foundations. Skeptics might sweep those foundations away with a single dismissive 
expression of doubt by questioning the assumption that politicians are being honest. The 
concern here, then, is that the validity of an ontological security lens may rest too heavily on 
whether to trust actors’ expressions of moral or emotional force, making it potentially 
inappropriate for some kinds of research problems simply due to data reliability issues. 
The second potential methodological weakness concerns whether actors think and feel 
in a way amenable to ontological security analysis in the first place. Scholars working on 
ontological security have already questioned whether their approach is appropriate for the 
study of corporate agents (Krolikowski 2008), and this skepticism is bolstered by other well-
known criticisms of anthropomorphized views of states. One defense of analyzing corporate 
entities is to emphasize the relational character of selfhood, but this still entails explicit, 
operative premises about the psychology of actors (Mitzen 2006a). Another is to confine 
ontological security analyses to persons only (see for example Steele 2008; 2010). Yet even 
focusing on specific persons of influence can be problematic; as relationally-minded scholars 
have observed, people may act as institutions, meaning that the form of selfhood salient to 
analysis can vary across settings and transform along with them (Jackson 2004). This is a 
larger problem of psychological theorizing in the field: it necessarily foregrounds individuals 
over their meso-level social setting. Even proponents of psychoanalytic social theory have 
recognized in their approach an under-theorization of broader socio-structural dimensions and 
processes, (Elliott 2014, 140-55). For some theoretical tasks this is a strength rather than a 
weakness (Craib 1990, 178), but it nevertheless rests on a host of psychological assumptions. 
For studying ephemeral, dynamical, polysemic, or simply poorly understood kinds of 
actors—such as might be found in settings undergoing rapid change, transnational 
 
psychoanalysis. Perhaps these policymakers are pandering to more specific constituencies, or have some broader 
strategic vision? If so, the problem dissolves. 
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communities such as diasporas, or in highly formalized or ritualized exchanges—these 
assumptions may not be justified. Indeed, it is an interesting empirical question whether an 
actor in a given case possesses a self that admits of psychological or affective analysis. 
Hence, and as with the authenticity assumption, there are cases where ontological security 
theorizing runs into methodological trouble, when it entails an emphasis on psychological 
and emotional factors. 
At this point, we confront two questions. First, what would be the explanatory value-
added of an alternative approach? Second, even if it were valuable, can such an alternative 
even be coherent? Can there be an analysis of ontological security and security-seeking 
without taking on board meta-theoretical premises assigning an operative role to these 
factors? Put simply, isn’t tracing the effects of psychological and affective processes on 
security-as-self the essential basis for ontological security scholarship? 
To answer the first, I argue that scholars working on ontological security engage in a 
central critical project: explaining why international actors (such as states or policymakers) 
behave in ways that appear costly and dangerous, at least when security is more narrowly 
understood as territorial integrity and invulnerability to attack. Moreover, the definitive 
ontological security explanation is that actors must secure and maintain their social existence 
before they are able to do anything else. This constitutes a distinctive analytical theme: the 
vocabulary of realist or rationalist international relations theory—replete with talk of security, 
strategy, and purposive, self-interested action—is used to articulate a constructivist, culturally 
and historically situated narrative. This narrative in turn undermines the assumptions of those 
approaches without sacrificing their epistemic goods, such as causal inference or observer-
independent referents.8 Put differently, ontological security theorizing in the field of 
international relations is only contingently linked to psychological and affective factors. Since 
emphasizing these factors may lead to the potential methodological problems just discussed, 
the ontological security project would be improved by the availability of an alternative 
approach—one which sustains its critical intervention through a different theoretical 
vocabulary. Moreover, such an alternative may open up a broader theoretical horizon. 
The second question, on the coherence of wholly relational view of ontological 
security, in which thoughts and feelings receive little emphasis, can be answered by 
examining the theoretical purpose of ontological security as a concept. The sociological 
function of ‘ontological security’, at least in Giddens, is to account for the durability of 
 
8In other words, ontological security scholars can be critical without being relativist; they are able to talk about a 
world ‘out there’. 
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structure and system, by assigning to actors a need for stability in social routines (Giddens 
1984; see also Loyal 2003; Archer 1982). For Giddens, and for scholars who have taken the 
concept further than Giddens himself did, the mechanism by which it does so is through the 
human need for stable and trustworthy routines of self-expression and self-perception. If 
other, non-psychological mechanisms could also account for the durability of social settings, 
and of the way actors secure their own continuity of being,, scholars would not need craft 
explanations based on detailed examinations of thoughts and feeling.. 
I aruge that such mechanisms do exist, but to understand them, scholars must shift to 
a different meta-theoretical vocabulary. The concepts and theoretical approaches from 
relational sociology make it possible to talk about ontological security in ways that 
foreground the specifics of mind and affect as the focus of explanation. Theories do not need 
to refer to particular kinds of thoughts and feelings; people have both, but their content is not 
salient. In the next section, I explain how this could be so. 
 
Implications of a relational view of ontological security 
A relational view of ontological security implies something potentially counter-intuitive: 
regardless of the particular form, substance, and expression selfhood takes, the security of the 
self is only conceivable within the context of durable social arrangements. While relationality 
is a broad and common theoretical concept, and is already present in the ontological security 
literature,9 this implication becomes clearest by approaching the concept through a specific 
tradition of thought. Commonly referred to as relational sociology, it characterised by a focus 
on process and influenced heavily by pragmatist philosophy (Emirbayer 1997; Dépelteau 
2013; Powell and Dépelteau 2013; Jackson and Nexon 1999). In particular, relational 
sociology provides a way of drawing out and building upon nascent dimensions of 
relationality already present in the overarching themes of ontological security, but not 
currently emphasized in existing work. 
In this section, I will concisely set forth what the concept of ontological security 
implies when approached through the lens of relational sociology, and how it is that the 
referent shifts from the self to the social arrangement. I propose three relational mechanisms 
by which ontological security may be attained. In doing so, I hope to outline the particular 
value-added that the relational view brings to the ontological security project in the field. 
 
 
9 See, for example, Rumelili (2015) and Mackay (2013). 
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Relational sociology and the definition of ontological security 
In the relational view I propose, the referent of ontological security is not the self but the 
social arrangement. By this term, I mean a structured configuration of transactions between 
actors, which serves as both the social environment in which action occurs and provides the 
social material out of which actors—as subjects imbued with dispositions and capacities—are 
constituted. The implication of this shift in referent is that actors are not trying to secure the 
coherence of self, but rather the coherence and stability of their broader social context. To 
understand why actors would do this, we should bear in mind three principles of relational 
sociology. 
 First, social arrangements are wholes. They feature formations and patterns, but are 
not, strictly speaking, made up of discrete or stratified spaces capable of hosting actors while 
remaining unaffected by actions. Therefore, actions taken in pursuit of ontological security 
must be placed within a broad social context, and be understood as part of a complex 
institutional and cultural tapestry. In this sense, they are forms of life: bundles of practices 
featuring continual, dynamic transformations of the conventions that define them and the 
actors that emerge out of them—for there is no clear difference between the two.10 Hence the 
stability of a social arrangement is the result of a careful balancing act, as actors, with greater 
or lesser degrees of intent, manage to sustain “a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium…moving to 
and fro, inclining first to one side and then to the other” (Elias 1978, 131). 
Second, selfhood is processual—that is, the cognitive and affective emerge out of an 
unfolding action process.11 Hence, from the perspective of relational sociology, the 
boundaries of self-identity and self-experience exist not just psychologically or emotionally, 
through anxieties and aversions to disruption, but also conceptually and institutionally, as a 
condition of possibility for selfhood making any sense as an idea. Investigating the more 
psychological dimensions of ontological security thus gains greater depth if accompanied by 
an examination of social setting. Conversely, theorizing ontological security with a particular 
focus on the mental or affective dimensions of selfhood is entirely consistent with the broader 
meta-theoretical commitments of relational sociology, and need not be a paradigmatically 
different approach. In other words, a relational view of ontological security is already 
commensurable with more psychologically oriented research. 
 
10See Wittgenstein (1958), not only on the term ‘form of life’, but also on ‘language games’.  
11 Specifically, ‘perception and cognition [exist] not as acts preceding action but as part of the action process 
that is inherently connected to the situational context’ (Joas and Beckert 2001, 273). Or, as Dewey puts it, 
‘[Mind] never denotes anything self-contained, isolated from the world of persons and things, but is always used 
with respect to situations, events, objects, persons and groups…Mind is primarily a verb’ (Dewey 1978?, 268; 
emphasis mine).   
10   A Relational View of Ontological Security   SF Pratt 
 
Third, agency is transactional. That is, agency arises out of an unfolding process of 
mutually constitutive engagement between actors and their worlds—neither specified apart 
from the other, and without either one independently pre-existing (Dewey and Bentley 1949, 
137; see also Dewey 1983: 117-8; Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Hence seeking or 
maintaining ontological security works through actions that are not merely discrete choices or 
routinised habits, but ‘situational structures rather than individual reflexes, psychic 
associations, or repeated actions’ (Alexander 1987, 142). Rather, actors and the social 
arrangements in which they live are a packaged deal: the one needs the other to continue to 
exist as such. Simply put, a major destabilization of social arrangements threatens actors’ 
agency. 
Together, these principles imply that ontological security is inseparable from social 
stability. There can be, therefore, an approach to theorizing ontological security that is not 
limited by empirical or conceptual problems in defining particular selves, and not reliant on 
references to psychological or affective factors. 
Two methodological approaches are particularly promising as frameworks for crafting 
ontological security explanations around relational mechanisms. While the mechanisms 
themselves are the same, they lead to significantly different ways of theorizing ontological 
security. The first and foremost  approachis field theory. Though there are a few varieties of 
field theory  (cf. Fligstein and McAdam 2012), they all converge on an appreciation for fields 
as “social order[s] in which actors…interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is 
not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others 
in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action” 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 1).12 In the context of fields, the three mechanisms I propose—
refereeing, performative deference, and obstructive resistance—offer ways of explaining the 
origins and outcomes of discrete episodes of contention. They thus deliver one of the key 
critical benefits of ontological security theorizing as a whole: a way of understanding the 
rationale of actions that appear costly or self-defeating when viewed through a conventional 
realist or liberal lens.13 
The second prominent relational framework is Norbert Elias’s concept of the 
‘figuration’: an interwoven complex of individuals living within a form of life,14 
“characterized by socially and historically specific forms of habitus, or personality-structure” 
 
12Field theory is more famously associated, however, with Pierre Bourdieu (1993), and Bourdieu in particular 
informs significant IR engagements with fields in both method (Pouliot 2007) and substance (Go 2008). 
13 See, for example, Go (2008) and Adler-Nissen (2013) 
14 ‘Form of life’ being another term borrowed from Wittgenstein. 
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(van Krieken 1998, 52-3; see also Elias 1994; 1978). Fields and figurations differ in some 
ontological premises,15 but also typically in the temporal and spatial breadth of the cases to 
which they’re applied. Studies of fields most often, though not exclusively (Gorski 2013), 
focus on shorter-term, tactical jockeying for position and power by competing actors, in cases 
where the broader social arrangement remains relatively stable. By contrast, figurational 
theorizing most often tackles change over an historical longue durée (see, for example, 
Linklater 2011; Jackson 2006).16 However, a figurational approach to ontological security 
may open a broader horizon of theorizing. As relational mechanisms are important 
instruments of ontological securing, examining their evolution over time—their development 
and transformation as practices or repertoires for sustaining social arrangements—brings new 
empirical domains into the historical study of security and conflict.17 The key take-away is 
that a relational view can extend the insights of ontological security theorizing into research 
areas that have previously been methodologically or ontologically out of bounds. 
 
Three Relational Mechanisms of Ontological Security 
To show how substantive theories of ontological security may by developed through a 
relational lens, I here discuss three possible mechanisms by which ontological security may 
be attained or preserved. All mechanisms might be called attempts at ‘game-keeping’, in both 
metaphorical senses—of preserving the ‘rules of the game’ and of securing a (social) ecology 
from foreign threats to its contents or challenges to its internal authority structures.18 They 
ensure that a given social arrangement continues to exist as such, maintaining the stability of 
its practices in the face of insurgent attempts at normative or institutional revision, or against 
external forces that could end those practices entirely. While there may be other mechanisms 
that could cause this, I have focused on three that seem obviously relevant to current 
international relations research: refereeing, performative deference, and obstructive 
resistance. 
 
15Notably, Bourdieu’s theory of practice carries the assumption that actors, while wide open in terms of the 
kinds of social arrangements they are disposed to (re)create, do experience some need to  
16 Note that field theory can also be used to study macro-historical change (Gorski 2013), and that the contrast 
between the two approaches drawn here is of emphasise rather than categorical analytical possibility. 
17 For example, the emergence of diplomatic cultures may be understood as a result of performative deference, 
shifting alliance configurations as a (possibly unforeseen) dimension of refereeing, or imperial and colonial 
governance as responses to obstructive resistance from peripheral communities. In the next section, I explain 
what I mean by this. 
18Akin, that is, to officials of a sport who force players to follow the rules and to foresters who protect the woods 
from poachers, respectively. 
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Refereeing occurs when actors intervene into disputes to which they are not an 
immediate party or obvious stake-holder, to pressure those involved to adhere to existing 
normative arrangements, preserving those arrangements as future contexts for action. A 
refereeing actor might impose themselves as a mediator through several ways: pure coercion, 
an appeal to the legitimacy of taking on such a role given existing norms, or—and perhaps 
most likely—a combination of the two. Situations featuring voluntary mediation by 
apparently non-interested actors appear puzzling, but they make sense if understood as the 
pursuit of ontological security. Crucially, by taking a relational view of ontological security, 
scholars do not need to assume that refereeing is done on the basis of an emotional or moral 
conviction to adopt a mediating role. Refereeing is rational if evidence suggests an actor is 
cynical or begrudging in their intervention, because it props up a broadly valuable order of 
things. What matters is not the specific motive but the general impetus to maintain a social 
arrangement necessary for a given form of life to go on.19 
Performative deference occurs when actors publicly show respect for extant 
normative arrangements, bolstering those arrangements and signalling credible commitments 
to remain within them. For example, a ‘strong’ actor might acquiesce to the demands of a 
‘weak’ actor on the basis of public moral claims, to reinforce the legitimacy of an underlying 
moral order and signal the potency of something other than coercion as a motivating force. 
This action is sensible even if evidence suggests that acquiescence is only to create the 
superficial appearance of moral commitment, and does not reflect the genuine values of an 
actor as they pertain to the particular issue in question. One example of this is ‘rhetorical 
coercion’ (Krebs and Jackson 2007), where one party in a discourse can talk another ‘into a 
corner’ through public argumentation. Rather than accept a claim due to rationally motivated 
persuasion, here actors are obliged to endorse claims simply to appear reasonable to an 
audience—for appearing unreasonable entails social costs. Essentially, performative 
deference is demonstrating commitment to upholding norms without any necessary belief or 
feeling that they are categorically legitimate and motivating, because failing to uphold them 
would threaten the broader normative basis for a given form of life. 
 Obstructive resistance occurs when actors impede attempts to transform social 
arrangements, by blocking status-quo-altering actions. This may involve reactionary 
violence, such as through oppression directed at insurgent movements. Yet it also may be 
seen in ‘passive’ attempts by communities to resist transformative interventions ‘from 
 
19 One example that may qualify is the involvement of certain smaller states, such as Norway or Canada, in 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution initiatives in places where they otherwise have a low level of investment. 
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above’, such as through what James C. Scott (1985, xvii) memorably describes as ‘foot-
dragging’ by villagers looking to impede state governance without provoking violent 
confrontation. While obstructive resistance is by no means a novel concept, viewing it as a 
way to seek ontological security places it in a different light. Challenges to ‘tradition’ do not 
need to be immediately dangerous, and indeed may promise narrow benefits (such as through 
changing the structure of an organization to make it more efficient); rather, they are 
threatening because they undermine the settled and robust character of social arrangements in 
their holistic sense. If one tradition can be changed, why not all traditions? Hence actors may 
engage in reactionary maneuvers even if they are not passionately attached (and may even 
seem ambivalent) to the particular features of the world they are preserving. 
 Notably, all of these mechanisms offer ontological security explanations without 
emphasising convictions, passions, and anxieties, but nevertheless establish a rational and 
causal basis to otherwise costly or seemingly irrational actions. Methodologically, this means 
that disputes over the reliability of narratives or the existence of corporate selfhood do not 
need to determine the appropriateness of an ontological security lens.  They refer to social 
interactions that can look the same whether they are motivated by categorical moral 
commitment to each action involved, or whether they are cynical and ‘purely strategic’. This 
in turn opens the door to a broader set of research approaches for studying how social 
arrangements rest on particular practices or evolve in holistic ways, and go beyond the search 
for motive or affect in specific actors. In other words, the methodological key to a relational 
analysis of ontological security lies in understanding how particular actions are essential 
components of a broader transactional context, out of which actors and their worlds emerge. 
If this is made the focus of analysis, the question of whether actors ‘really believe/feel’ the 
moral and metaphysical truth of a norm, identity, or routine fades in salience; either way, the 
resulting form of ontological security theorizing refers to dynamics that go beyond particular 
actors in transactional and temporal scale. 
  
 
Moving Forward and Making Theory 
Relational approaches to understanding security already feature in ongoing research in 
the field of international relations, and in a variety of theoretical orientations.20 Meanwhile, 
 
20For example, both Bigo (2011) and Poiliot (2008) have used Bourdieu as provided a starting point for 
investigations of different dimensions of power politics, while a recent volume edited by Guillaume and 
Huysmans (2013) contains a range of perspectives on processes of citizenship-negotiation as a set of multi-
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some scholars have already drawn upon the concept of ontological security to examine 
security and power in relational terms.21 If this is the state of the field, then it may not be 
clear what is so new or helpful about bringing ontological security into the picture. 
 Yet there are several benefits to the relational view proposed here that make it a 
worthy addition—as opposed to alternative—to the existing body of theory on ontological 
security. The first relates to methodological limits and problems of explanations emphasizing 
thoughts and feelings, and the benefit to ontological security theorists of a more thoroughly 
relational approach. This has already been discussed at length, and need not be re-litigated. 
However, relational theorists also stand to benefit from the confrontation with ontological 
security, at least as it is presented here. Ontological security, as a theme or project, calls 
attention to dimensions of action they might otherwise ignore.  
Those in the field who have drawn upon relational sociology have often focused on 
the macro-historical level (see, for example, Nexon 2009; Linklater 2011), rather than on 
theorizing action. Meanwhile, the prominence of Bourdieu within the ‘practice turn’ in the 
field (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Büger and Gadinger 2015)22 obliges the scholars associated 
with it to confront his structuralist limitations.23 Finally, for critical international relations 
theorists, relational scholarship often consists of synchronic analyses of semiotic and 
performative structures—of how embodied textual and conceptual formations provide bases 
for some claims or practices and deny them to others24—and is genealogical or linguistic in 
methodological scope.25  
The relational view of ontological security I propose offers those theorists a causal 
vocabulary for connecting practices (of social arrangement maintenance) and forms of 
 
dimensional and hierarchical relations amongst states and their associated polities. The Copenhagen School of 
security studies is explicitly oriented around what is, at its core, a processusal transaction: the ‘securitizing’ of a 
referent object or good—supposedly under threat—by an agent to an audience (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 
1998, 26). Limitations of space preclude an extensive discussion of these other forms of relational theorizing, 
but it is worthwhile to note that they proceed from varying views of action, and thus are not necessarily 
commensurable with the relational view proposed here. 
21For example, Steele’s aesthetic theory of power and ‘counter-power’ as emerging out of the affective 
consequences of certain kinds of discursive exchanges upon elites (2010). Indeed, Steele has also explicitly 
suggested that one advantage of a psychoanalytic approach is precisely that it focuses attention on ‘internally 
driven’ mechanisms that may be obscured by the relational sociological lens (Steele 2008, 125). 
22As Büger and Gadinger (2015) note, there are other prominent conceptions of practice that fewer IR scholars 
have used, but which may promise greater traction on certain problems. Among them are views derived from 
pragmatist philosophy. 
23As others have observed at length (Margolis 1999; Bohman 1999; Jenkins 2002), Bourdieu’s brand of 
relationalism provides relatively little space for reflective and creative agency—his theory of practice remains at 
least partially beholden to the determinism of structuralism and Marxism, despite the many ways in which it is 
an improvement on both. 
24 This being a defining feature of Foucauldian and post-structuralist critiques. 
25 See, for example, Walker and Cooper (2011) and De Goede (2008). For further discussion of extant critical 
security approaches, see Van Munster (2007). 
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situated agency to their symbolic worlds. This does not subsume or prioritize one over the 
other, but instead links two angles on tracing the scope of creative possibility within power-
saturated and culturally defined forms of life. In other words, and more so than with existing 
attempts at doing exactly this with ontological security concepts (Rumelili 2015), the 
proposed approach establishes a broader horizon for investigating the causal underpinnings 
and implications of what existing critical security theorizing reveals. 
A relational view of ontological security also speaks to at least one concrete topic of 
ongoing enquiry: it is especially well suited to studying precarious forms of transnational life. 
Entities such as diasporas, nomads, and newly emerging social movements—or, in previous 
eras, pirates (Mackay 2013)—often extend through communities that cross borders, great 
physical distances, and multiple cultural contexts (Agnew 1994; Adamson 2016). They exist, 
in other words, in social arrangements that lie outside of many key normative infrastructures 
designed to protect, regulate, and steer international politics. They introduce new forms of 
security concerns hard to grasp with more conventional methodological frameworks in the 
field (Adamson 2016), pose governmental challenges to existing international institutions, but 
also offer new possible solutions to existing problems (such as to climate change—see 
Hoffman 2011), and disclose new possibilities for the constitution of supra- or non-national 
polities (Abraham and Abramson 2015).  
The relational view offers a way to answer basic questions about the organizational 
kinds, processes, and contexts constitutive of these forms of life. It helps us understand their 
conditions for continued existence, and how actors within them navigate an international 
environment with few resources for those who dwell outside of state institutions. If the 
referent of ontological security is the social arrangement, then precarious transnational actors 
may engage in activities oriented largely around sustaining that precariousness, even if this is 
dangerous in other ways and unrelated to any specific moral commitments they hold.  That is, 
resisting (re-)integration may be the function or purpose of a whole range of acts, and 
studying how this works in practice illuminates actors’ and communities’ boundaries, 
capacities, and trajectories. Through the approach proposed here, scholars can examine what 
kind of coherence-producing work actors engage in without many assumptions about the 
thoughts and feelings of people in diverse cultural and institutional settings. 
 
Conclusions 
I have proposed a relational view of ontological security oriented around the premise that 
actors attempt to secure their social arrangements, in a holistic sense, as a precondition to 
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further action within them. I suggested three causal mechanisms—refereeing, performative 
deference, and obstructive resistance—suitable for theorizing particular cases of this. These 
mechanisms refer to enacted, inter-subjective, and mind-external ways that actions maintain 
configurations of relations, and address a need for ontological security. In other words, as 
with existing ontological security theorizing, there is a clear object in need of securing, a 
clear causal dimension to acts of securing, and a clear way one outcome of those acts could 
be behavior that does not conform to traditional understandings of how states pursue security. 
The approach I propose thus expands the meta-theoretical resources available in the existing 
conversation on ontological security in the study of international relations, providing an 
expansive relational basis for delivering its definitive theoretical interventions. As a result, 
that conversation should be open to a wider range perspectives and explanatory tools, such as 
from by the growing number of international relations scholars interested in pragmatism and 
relational sociology. 
 This approach also contributes to broader relational theorizing of international 
politics. Many relational accounts in the field proceed via social-theoretical terms that make it 
difficult to locate the creativity and indeterminacy of action. While such terms do not entirely 
preclude effective discussion of agency, the ones at stake in a relational understanding of 
ontologial security emphasise agency and contingency to a fuller degree. Moreover, what I 
offer here grants greater prominence to the pragmatist dimension of relational sociology. This 
dimension has received comparatively limited attention,—even from those relational scholars 
who have draw directly or indirectly upon pragmatist sources. Both of these areas of 
contribution show the flexibility of ontological security as a lever for uncovering—or prying 
apart—dynamics of situated action that fall into the cracks between other conceptual 
frameworks. Hence, it confronts other relational views of security with critical themes of the 
ontological security literature, and therefore challenges scholars in those traditions to engage 
those themes. In other words, joining the projects of ontological security and relational 
sociology, and elaborating upon points of sympathy between them, expands both in 
theoretical scope and sensitivity. 
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